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Abstract—The pool-hopping attack casts down the expected profits of both the mining pool and honest miners in Blockchain. The
mainstream countermeasures, namely PPS (pay-per-share) and PPLNS (pay-per-last-N-share), can hedge pool hopping, but pose a
risk to the pool as well as the cost to miners. In this study, we apply the zero-determinant (ZD) theory to design a novel pooled mining
which offers an incentive mechanism for motivating non-memorial and memorial evolutionary miners not to switch in pools strategically.
In short, our hopping-proof pooled mining has three unique features: 1) fee-free. No fee is charged if the miner does not hop. 2) wide
applicability. It can be employed in both prepaid and postpaid mechanisms. 3) fairness. Even the pool can dominate the game with any
miner, he has to cooperate when the miner does not hop among pools. The fairness of our scheme makes it have long-term
sustainability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a hopping-proof pooled mining with the above three natures
simultaneously. Both theoretical and experimental analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme.
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F
1 INTRODUCTION
B LOCKCHAIN is the underlying fabric of mainstreamcryptocurrency systems such as Bitcoin [1] and
Ethereum [2]. These cryptocurrencies have obtained a phe-
nomenal success, recognized as the wave of future [3] with a
total market capitalization around 179.6B dollars at present.
To realize a distributed and trustable consensus, a data
structure called blockchain1 is introduced in Blockchain
system. It is a public ledger including a sequence of chained
blocks, with each recording a set of digital transactions. Since
anyone can participate in creating and verifying blocks,
Blockchain system is open, leading to its vulnerability.
To deter attacks incurred by the openness of Blockchain
system which essentially originates from its decentralized
nature, a Proof-of-Work (PoW) [1] mechanism is employed,
which allows network participants, i.e., miners, can approve
new transactions only after mining a block successfully,
implying that they need to solve cryptographic puzzles
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1. In this paper, we use Blockchain to denote the technology while
blockchain to indicate a chain of blocks.
in the form of a hash computation with success. PoW
undoubtedly increases the cost of malicious behavior, mak-
ing many security attacks such as Sybil attack financially
unaffordable. This is because 1) mining is actually a race
where only the winner who solves the PoW task first can
verify digital transactions, which needs a sufficient amount
of computational power; 2) solving cryptographic puzzles
is a probabilistic process, implying that no one would win
the race with certainty even though it is computationally
powerful.
In return for mining blocks successfully, miners are re-
warded in proportion to the computational powers they in-
vested. However, due to significant computational resources
needed and probabilistic factors involved in the mining
process, a solo miner has low expected revenue as well as
volatility in the reward. For example, Bitcoin system now
sets the difficulty of mining such that one block is generated
every 10 minutes. Hence, a solo miner often has to wait 687
days in expectation to mine a block [4].
To tackle the above issue, solo miners join coalitions
in the form of mining pools, gathering their computational
powers to seek the solution of PoW puzzles and sharing
the rewards proportionally to their contributions. This un-
doubtedly increases the chance of solving cryptographic
puzzles successfully and makes the mining process more
predictable. Hence, pooled mining can benefit miners from
high payoffs and low variance in rewards. At present, nearly
80% of the computing power in Bitcoin and 60% of that
in Ethereum belong to less than 8 and 3 mining pools,
respectively.
The dominant position of pooled mining leads it to
become a valuable target to be attacked. Many pools have
an open trait, allowing any miner to join them through
public Internet interfaces [5], which makes matters worse.
Such a nature of openness makes pooled mining susceptible
to attacks. There are mainly three kinds of security attacks
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2in pooled mining: the selfish mining attack [6], [7], [8], the
block withholding attack [5], [9], [10] and the pool-hopping
attack [11]. The first two attacks can be well solved through
the state-of-the-art approaches [7], [8], [9], [10], [12], and
hence, we focus on the last one.
The pool-hopping attack was first proposed by Rosen-
feld [11], in which the malicious miners strategically switch
among the pools to obtain a higher payoff. This attack is
cost-efficient and straightforward because of no more extra
operations (e.g., keeping the block secret, dropping full
proof of work or forking) needed. Studies have proved that
the miner has no incentive to stay in a pool without pool
hopping or redistributing the computing power [4], [9], [12].
This kind of greedy and opportunistic manner definitely
casts down the mining power of a pool, resulting in its
declined expected revenue. In addition, the pool-hopping
attack also jeopardizes the interests of honest miners, who
join in a pool continuously without switching to other pools.
According to [11], the honest miners in the attacked pool
will receive 43% less payoff in the worst-case theoretically,
which is unfair for them.
However, little research has studied the pool-hopping
attack. PPS and PPLNS [11] are pioneer countermeasures.
Considering that the unbalanced distribution of reward over
time makes room for miners’ strategic hopping, the key idea
of PPS and PPLNS is reducing the variance of reward in time
series. Typically, in a PPS pool, a miner will be rewarded
as long as she2 submits a share (her contribution) to the
pool, regardless of whether a block is mined successfully or
not. PPLNS, one of the most prevailing reward mechanisms
[13], drops the concept of “round”, focusing on N shares
submitted to the pool recently and distributing rewards
according to the shares in proportion.
Essentially, the difference between PPS and PPLNS lies
in that the former is driven by events while the latter is
triggered by time. In detail, PPS rewards a miner once
the event of receiving her share happens; PPLNS evaluates
whether a miner should be awarded when the paying time
arrives. The common feature of PPS and PPLNS is that they
pay miners proportionally to their contribution, regardless
of whether a block is mined successfully or not. Due to the
uncertainty of mining results, the pool takes the full risk
when no block is mined. Therefore, both PPS and PPLNS
charge miners some fees to alleviate such a risk, which is
critical to both of the pool and its members. The higher the
fee, the higher the cost of the miner joining in the pool, and
the smaller the motivation to mine and vice versa.
In a nutshell, the mainstream countermeasures to the
pool-hopping attack, namely PPS and PPLNS, pose a risk
to the pool as well as the cost to miners. Therefore, we
propose a hopping-proof pooled mining with free fee in
this paper, which can hedge pool hopping without any fee
charged if the miner does not switch in pools strategically.
The proposed pooled mining strategy has a wide scope of
application since it can be employed in both prepaid and
postpaid mechanisms. The former rewards once share is
submitted, no matter whether there is a success mining
2. In this paper, we denote the pool as “he” and the miner as “she”
for easy differentiation.
or not; the latter awards only when the full cryptographic
puzzle is solved.
It is challenging to realize the hopping-proof pooled
mining without fee charged. The reasons behind the fact
are: a) the strategic transferring among different pools is
the instinctive demand of a miner. Especially when no
fee is charged, costless hopping easily arouses miners to
switch among pools; b) in the postpaid mode, mining risk
is completely transferred from the pool to miners. In this
situation, it is non-trivial to motivate miners to still work
without hopping.
To tackle these challenges, we take advantage of the zero-
determinant (ZD) theory to design an incentive mechanism
for pooled mining, where cooperation (i.e., mining without
hopping) is the dominant strategy of a rational miner in
all situations. The ZD theory was first developed in [14] by
Press and Dyson, in which the player who adopts the ZD
strategy (i.e., the ZD adopter) can unilaterally set its adver-
sary’s utility no matter what strategy the adversary takes.
The power of the ZD strategy endows the pool to dominate
the game with any miner, rewarding her cooperation and
punishing the defection, to lure the cooperation of the miner.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• The interaction between the pool and any miner is
formulated as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD)
game and the corresponding conditions are also
identified. The generality of our model empowers
the proposed pooled mining to have a wide scope
of application, implying that it is suitable to both
prepaid and postpaid mechanisms. When applied in
a postpaid mechanism, the proposed pooled mining
can incentivize miners to work without hopping
while keeping the pool away from the risk of no
block mined successfully.
• We investigate in detail whether the pool can be a ZD
adopter and how he plays the ZD strategy. We draw
a conclusion that the pool can unilaterally control the
miner’s payoff rather than his own one. The specific
expected payoff of a miner that the pool can set is
characterized.
• An incentive mechanism based on the ZD theory
is proposed for motivating the non-memorial and
memorial evolutionary miners to work without hop-
ping. Specifically, the proposed mechanism empow-
ers the pool to encourage the miner to behave coop-
eratively by increasing her short-term payoff without
any additional payment in the long run.
• Both theoretical and experimental analyses demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive
mechanism. More importantly, we find the proposed
pooled mining is fair, implying that even the pool
can dominate the game with any miner, he has
to cooperate when the miner works collaboratively.
The fairness of our scheme makes it have long-term
sustainability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the formulation of our problem. The ZD strategy
for the pool in an iterated prisoner’s game is deduced
in Section 3. Based on which, we propose an incentive
3mechanism in light of the ZD theory in Section 4. We
evaluate the mechanism both theoretically in Section 5 and
experimentally in Section 6. The related literatures are listed
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes our paper finally.
2 GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce our game model to formulate
the interaction between the pool and the miner. Generally,
we define the strategy space of each player as a dichotomous
space, namely cooperation (c) and defection (d). In the PoW
mining scenario, the pool is considered as a cooperator if
he decides to pay the highest payoff to the miner; oth-
erwise, he is regarded as a defector. On the other hand,
the miner can devote herself wholeheartedly to the current
pool by providing her total computational power to the
pool without hopping, defined as cooperation, or contribute
herself halfheartedly through offering partial computing
ability or switching to other pools strategically, denoted
by defection. We denote the actions of the pool and the
miner as x, y ∈ {c, d}, respectively. Therefore, there are four
possibilities of states in each round between the pool and
the miner, i.e., XY = (cc, cd, dc, dd), where X and Y denote
the state of the pool and that of the miner, respectively. It is
worth to note that the terminal of a mining round mentioned
in our model can be defined as the time a block is mined
successfully or the paying time similar to that in PPLNS.
Hence, the proposed scheme can be applied in both prepaid
and postpaid mechanisms.
Each state will correspond to specific payoffs for both
players, which can be derived as follows:
• if both the pool and the miner are collaborative with
the pool providing the highest payoff and the miner
offering her entire computing power to the current
pool, the payoffs of them are represented as Kp and
Km, respectively;
• when the miner defects while the pool cooperates,
the miner will get an increase of σ > 0 based on
her original payoff Km, while the pool may obtain a
decrease of pi > 0 on Kp;
• in the case that the defective pool plays against a
cooperative miner, the payoff of the pool increases
by µ > 0, while the miner receives a loss of ρ > 0;
• when both players behave maliciously, the payoffs of
the pool and the miner areKp−pi+µ andKm+σ−ρ,
respectively.
Subsequently, the payoff vectors of the pool, denoted as
Sp = (S
xy
p ), and the miner, denoted as Sm = (S
xy
m ), x, y ∈
{c, d}, can be presented as follows
Sp = (S
cc
p , S
cd
p , S
dc
p , S
dd
p ) = (Kp,Kp−pi,Kp+µ,Kp−pi+µ),
Sm = (S
cc
m , S
cd
m , S
dc
m , S
dd
m ) = (Km,Km+σ,Km−ρ,Km+σ−ρ),
which are also shown in Table 1.
Next, some insightful theorems are introduced to char-
acterize the game in the following.
Theorem 2.1. If pi > µ, ρ > σ, µ < ρ, σ < pi, a prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) game can be modeled to depict the confrontation
between the pool and the miner.
TABLE 1
Payoff matrix of the pool and the miner
Pool
Miner Cooperation Defection
Cooperation Kp,Km Kp − pi,Km + σ
Defection Kp + µ,Km − ρ Kp − pi + µ,Km + σ − ρ
Proof: To become a PD game, two fundamental con-
ditions should be satisfied. In detail, 1) the stable state
occurs when both players defect, i.e., XY = dd is the
Nash equilibrium; 2) mutual cooperation is the best outcome
with respect to the social welfare, which means XY = cc
outperforms other states from an overall perspective.
The game between the pool and the miner satisfies the
first condition. To be specific, if the miner is friendly, the
pool will get a lower payoff as Kp when he cooperates
than his payoff of Kp + µ when he defects; besides, if the
pool challenges with a malicious miner, the payoff when
he defects, i.e., Kp − pi + µ, is also larger than that of his
cooperation, i.e., Kp−pi. Thus, as a rational decision maker,
the pool will always choose to defect rather than coopera-
tion when facing an adversary with uncertain actions. With
similar analysis, we can find the only feasible option for a
rational miner is also to behave viciously. Accordingly, both
the pool and the miner will select defection as the stable
state. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of this game comes
to be XY = dd.
In order to investigate the second condition clearly, we
denote the social welfare in each state as Wcc, Wcd, Wdc
and Wdd. Thus, we have Wcc = Kp + Km, Wcd =
Kp + Km + σ − pi, Wdc = Kp + Km − ρ + µ, and
Wdd = Kp+Km+σ+µ−ρ−pi. Then the second condition
is satisfied when Wcc > Wcd,Wcc > Wdc,Wcc > Wdd hold.
It is obvious that when pi > µ, ρ > σ, µ < ρ, σ < pi, the
above inequalities can be satisfied. Based on the analyses
above, as self-regarding players, the pool and the miner
will choose malicious behavior to maximize their payoffs,
leading to mutual defection as the stable state in the game
consequently. However, the most favorable outcome of the
confrontation turns out to be mutual cooperation. Therefore,
a PD game is formed when pi > µ, ρ > σ, µ < ρ, σ < pi.
Notably, the miner may stay in the current pool for a
long time without hopping to others. Hence, in this case,
the PD game mentioned above can become an iterated one
if some conditions are satisfied, which are summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. If pi > µ, ρ > σ, µ < ρ, σ < pi, the confrontation
between the pool and the miner can be modeled as an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game.
Proof: A PD game becomes an iterated one when the
payoff of any player’s persistence on cooperation is larger
than hopping between cooperation and defection. In other
words, the inequalities below should hold{
2Kp > Kp + µ+Kp − pi,
2Km > Km + σ +Km − ρ. (1)
Hence, when pi > µ, ρ > σ, µ < ρ and σ < pi, the game
between the pool and the miner can be modeled as an IPD
one.
4In light of the above analyses, we can find that the miner
and the pool may be trapped into the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma, where the Nash equilibrium is far away from
mutual cooperation, leading to low efficiency and distrust
for Blockchain system in the long run. To tackle this prob-
lem, we employ the powerful ZD strategy to drive the
players to cooperate so as to reach the win-win situation. As
introduced in Section 1, the ZD adopter can unilaterally set
its adversary’s payoff no matter what strategy the adversary
takes.
Aware of such an effective strategy, the pool is attracted
to use the ZD strategy to resist a hopping miner. In this case,
however, we are facing the following problems: is the pool
capable of being a ZD adopter? if yes, how does the ZD strategy
work? To address these questions, we conduct the following
analyses.
3 ZD STRATEGY FOR THE POOL
In this section, we examine whether the pool can play
the ZD strategy, and if yes, how to achieve that. Firstly,
a Markov game is established between the pool and the
miner. As mentioned in Section 2, there are four possible
game results, i.e., XY = (cc, cd, dc, dd), in each round.
We define the pool’s mixed strategy as p = (p1, p2, p3, p4),
where p1 represents the probability of choosing cooperation
in this round based on the previous outcome cc. Similarly,
when the previous outcome is cd, dc or dd, the probability
of the pool to cooperate in this round is p2, p3 or p4.
Accordingly, the probability of the pool being defective in
each round is (1− p1, 1− p2, 1− p3, 1− p4) corresponding
to different game results in last round. Comparably, in the
cases that the miner chooses to cooperate when cc, cd, dc
or dd happens previously, her strategy can be denoted as
q = (q1, q2, q3, q4), while the probability of defecting is
(1− q1, 1− q2, 1− q3, 1− q4).
With the above-defined strategies of the pool and the
miner, the Markov matrix in each round can be derived as
follow,
A =

p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)
p2q2 p2(1− q2) (1− p2)q2 (1− p2)(1− q2)
p3q3 p3(1− q3) (1− p3)q3 (1− p3)(1− q3)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)
 ,
where each element denotes the probability of state transi-
tion. For example, if the previous outcome is cc, combining
the cooperation probabilities of the pool and the miner, i.e.,
p1 and q1, the probability of XY = cc in this round is p1q1,
so do other elements in A.
Denote v as the stationary vector of matrix A, then
vTA = vT and vTM = 0, where M = A − I (I is
the identity matrix). According to the Cramer’s rule, the
equation Adj(M)M = det(M)I = 0 holds, where Adj(M)
and det(M) represent the adjugate matrix and the determi-
nant of M. Subsequently, the equation above indicates that
every row of Adj(M) is in proportion to v [14]. Thus, if
the dot product of v with any vector f = (f1, f2, f3, f4)T is
conducted, the determinate remains unchanged with some
elementary column transformation, such as adding the first
column to the second and the third columns. Thus, we have,
v · f = D(p,q, f) = det

p1q1 − 1 p1 − 1 q1 − 1 f1
p2q2 p2 − 1 q2 f2
p3q3 p3 q3 − 1 f3
p4q4 p4 q4 f4
 .
It is evident that the second column of the above deter-
minant is only related to the pool’s strategy. Based on this,
the expected payoffs of the pool (Sp) and the miner (Sm)
can be derived as
Sp =
v · Sp
v · 1 =
D(p,q,Sp)
D(p,q,1)
,
Sm =
v · Sm
v · 1 =
D(p,q,Sm)
D(p,q,1)
. (2)
Hence, the linear relationship between the pool and the
miner’s expected payoffs holds as follows
αSp + βSm + γ =
D(p,q, αSp + βSm + γ1)
D(p,q,1)
, (3)
where α, β, γ are coefficients.
Therefore, if the pool sets his strategy the same as
αSp + βSm + γ1, the determinant in the numerator equals
0, because there exists two identical columns. In this case,
αSp + βSm + γ = 0, implying that a linear relation is estab-
lished between the expected payoffs Sp and Sm, where the
corresponding strategy is therefore called Zero-Determinant
Strategy, denoted as pˆ below.
Specifically, when the pool sets pˆ = βSm + γ1 (i.e.,
α = 0), the pool can control the miner’s expected payoff
independently as Sm = − γβ ; while when he exerts his
strategy as pˆ = αSp + γ1 by setting β = 0, he can set his
own expected payoff at Sp = − γα . The following theorem
demonstrates the effectiveness of the ZD strategy adopted
by the pool.
Theorem 3.1. The pool can unilaterally control the miner’s
expected payoff as Sm =
(1−p1)Sddm +p4Sccm
1−p1+p4 , while he is not able to
set his own expected payoff independently.
Proof: Firstly, if the pool wants to control his adver-
sary’s expected payoff as Sm = − γβ by setting α = 0,
the specific ZD strategy of the pool should satisfy pˆ =
βSm + γ1, according to which, we can deduce p2 and p3
with respect to p1 and p4,
p2 =
p1(S
cd
m − Sddm )− (1 + p4)(Scdm − Sccm)
Sccm − Sddm
,
p3 =
(1− p1)(Sddm − Sdcm ) + p4(Sccm − Sdcm )
Sccm − Sddm
.
(4)
It is evident that p2 and p3 are meaningful as they belong
to [0, 1]. Therefore, it is clear that being a ZD player, the
pool can set the miner’s expected payoff unilaterally. And
the miner’s expected payoff comes to be
Sm = −γ
β
=
(1− p1)Sddm + p4Sccm
1− p1 + p4 . (5)
As (5) consisting of a weighted average of Sccm and S
dd
m
with weights p4 and 1 − p1, we can conclude that the
5expected payoff of the miner can be set in the range of
[Sddm , S
cc
m ] by the pool’s ZD strategy.
Secondly, when it comes to the case that the pool sets
his own expected payoff, the ZD adopter’s strategy should
meet pˆ = αSp + γ1 (β = 0). Using p1 and p4 to represent α
and γ, we have
α =
p1 − p4 − 1
Sccp − Sddp
,
γ =
(1− p1)Sddp + p4Sccp
Sccp − Sddp
.
(6)
And we can use p1 and p4 to describe p2 and p3 as
p2 =
(1 + p4)(S
cc
p − Scdp )− p1(Sddp − Scdp )
Sccp − Sddp
,
p3 =
−(1− p1)(Sdcp − Sddp )− p4(Sdcp − Sccp )
Sccp − Sddp
,
(7)
which indicates p2 ≥ 1 and p3 ≤ 0. Under this condition,
the pool’s strategy is feasible in only one case, i.e., pˆ =
(1, 1, 0, 0), resulting in α = 0 and γ = 0 according to (6).
Thus, as a ZD player, the pool cannot control his payoff.
4 INCENTIVE MECHANISM BASED ON THE ZD
STRATEGY
In this section, we propose a ZD-based incentive mech-
anism for the pooled mining to hinder pool-hopping at-
tacks. Theorem 3.1 reveals the capability of the pool as a
ZD player to set the miner’s expected payoff unilaterally.
However, whether the pool can take advantage of such a
capability to regulate the miner depends on her strategy. If
the miner’s strategy is irrelevant to her payoff, such as all-
cooperation (ALLC, q = (1, 1, 1, 1)), all-defection (ALLD,
q = (0, 0, 0, 0)), tit-for-tat (TFT, q = (1, 1, 0, 0)), the pool
cannot employ the ZD strategy to motivate the cooperative
behavior of the miner. Hence, the proposed ZD-based incen-
tive mechanism is suitable for the case that the strategy is
laid down by the miner in light of her payoff. Win-stay-lose-
shift (WSLS, q = (1, 0, 0, 1)) and evolutionary strategies are
typical payoff-driven examples.
A WSLS player will keep the same strategy as the
previous round in which the outcome is good, that is so
called “win-stay”. Otherwise, it will adopt the strategy
opposite to the one in the previous round, which is therefore
named as “lose-shift”. Hence, WSLS can be regarded as a
particular case of the evolutionary strategy. In this work,
we take the evolutionary strategy as the representative for
further analysis, which can be categorized into two kinds:
non-memorial and memorial. We introduce them in detail as
follows.
4.1 Evolutionary strategies
The non-memorial evolutionary (E) strategy is featured by
the fact that an E player may develop the strategy only
based on its expected payoff. Specifically, as a rational
player, if the cooperative behavior brings about a higher
payoff than the defective one, the E player will choose to
collaborate and vice versa. A typical non-memorial evolu-
tionary strategy can be formulated as follow [15],
qt(c|p) = e
[Etm(c|p)−Etm(d|p)]
1 + e[E
t
m(c|p)−Etm(d|p)]
, (8)
where qt(c|p) denotes the non-memorial E player’s coop-
eration probability in round t based on the pool’s strategy
p and  > 0 is a scaling parameter. Besides, Etm(c|p) and
Etm(d|p) represent the expected payoffs of the miner who
acts cooperatively and defectively.
Different from the non-memorial evolutionary strategy,
the memorial evolutionary strategy is associated with not
only the expected payoff but also its strategy in the previous
round, which we call it memory. That is to say, informed of
the previous strategy and the expected payoff, the memorial
E player may adjust its strategy more rationally.
Inspired by [16], we present the memorial evolutionary
strategy as following: if the cooperation probabilities of the
pool and the miner are denoted as pt and qt in round t, then
the miner’s cooperation probability qt+1 in the next round
evolves as
qt+1 = qt · W
t
c
Etm
, (9)
where W tc indicates the expected payoff of the miner when
she cooperates and Etm implies the expected payoff of the
miner in round t. Accordingly,W tc andE
t
m can be calculated
by
W tc = p
t · Sccm + (1− pt) · Sdcm ,
Etm = q
t ·W tc + (1− qt) ·W td,
(10)
where W td = p
t · Scdm + (1− pt) · Sddm is the miner’s expected
payoff when she defects.
4.2 ZD incentive mechanism
From equations (8) and (9), it is clear that if the miner
obtains more payoff as a cooperative player, her cooperation
probability will increase. That is to say, the miner is more
likely to devote her computing power entirely to the pool
without hopping if such an action brings about a higher
payoff. Therefore, as a ZD player, the pool may reward the
cooperation of a miner with a higher payoff while punishing
her defection with the lower one. Based on this, we propose
a ZD-based incentive mechanism for the pool to coerce the
miner’s collaborative action, thereby deterring the hopping
behavior of the miner, which is detailed in the following.
As shown in Algorithm 1, in the first round, we offer
the reward to each miner i (i = 1, 2, ..., N ) proportionally to
her contribution to the pool. The historical best computing
power Bi is recorded as the initial computation power of
each miner i, namely m1i (Lines 1-4). In practice, whether
a miner behaves cooperatively or defectively can not be
deduced without any side information, since it is the private
information of the miner. Hence, the pool has to differentiate
a collaborate or defective miner based on the observation
of the difference of computational powers between two
continuous rounds. This requires the pool to record the
computation power mji of any miner i at the end of each
round j (Line 7), so that the pool can obtain the difference
of the devoted computational power of miner i between
6Algorithm 1 The ZD-based incentive mechanism
Require:
The total number of iterations, M ;
The number of miners, N ;
The initial computation power of miner i, m1i ;
The minimum and maximum payoffs that the pool can
offer, L and H ;
1: for i = 1 to N do
2: Calculate the initial reward according to m
1
i∑N
i=1 m
1
i
·[H−
L] + L
3: Bi = m
1
i
4: end for
5: for i = 1 to N do
6: for j = 2 to M do
7: Update computation power mji
8: ∆mji = m
j
i −mj−1i
9: if ∆mji < 0 then
10: Calculate pj which makes Eji = L
11: else if ∆mji = 0 then
12: pj = pj−1 which makes Eji = E
j−1
i
13: else if ∆mji > 0 then
14: if Bi < m
j
i then
15: Bi = m
j
i
16: end if
17: y = (
∆mji
Bi
+ 1) · Ej−1i
18: Calculate pj which makes Eji = H ∗ e
ζ·y
1+eζ·y
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
round j− 1 and round j, i.e., ∆mji = mji −mj−1i (Line 8). If
∆mji ≥ 0, miner i is considered to be a cooperative player
and vice versa.
When ∆mji < 0, the miner splits her computing power
into other pools3, implying she is a pool-hopping attacker.
Her payoff is therefore needed to be reduced in order to
hinder such an attack. Under this situation, the pool will
exert the ZD strategy, setting the attacker’s payoff as the
minimum one, i.e., L (Lines 9-10). If ∆mji = 0, the pool
provides the same payoff to the miner as that in the last
round (Lines 11-12). When ∆mji > 0, the pool would update
Bi if needed (Lines 14-16). Since this case indicates the
miner behaves more cooperatively, the pool will increase
her payoff as Eji = H ∗ e
ζ·y
1+eζ·y , where y = (
∆mji
Bi
+ 1) ·Ej−1i
and ζ > 0 represents a scaling parameter (Line 17-18). It
is worth to note that the more increment of computational
power relative to Bi is, the higher reward the miner can
obtain, which is up to the maximum payoff that the pool
can offer, namely H .
5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed incentive mecha-
nism theoretically.
3. The situation where the miner is unavailable due to some reasons
such as lacking of electricity is out of our consideration in this paper.
Theorem 5.1. For any non-memorial evolutionary miner who is
motivated by the ZD incentive mechanism, it is conceivable that
the miner’s cooperation probability will be maximized.
Proof: To maximize qt(c|p) according to (8), we turn
to prove that Etm(c|p) − Etm(d|p) rises with the increase of
game round t if the miner is a cooperative one. According
to Algorithm 1, if any miner i behaves more cooperatively
than the previous round, we have
Etm(c|p)− Etm(d|p) = H ∗
eζ·y
1 + eζ·y
− L
= H ∗ e
ζ·( ∆m
t
i
Bi
+1)·Rt−1i
1 + e
ζ·( ∆m
t
i
Bi
+1)·Rt−1i
− L.
(11)
Since (∆m
t
i
Bi
+ 1) · Rt−1i keeps raising because of the
miner’s collaborative behavior, e
ζ·( ∆m
t
i
Bi
+1)·Rt−1
i
1+e
ζ·( ∆m
t
i
Bi
+1)·Rt−1
i
becomes
to one at last, leading Etm(c|p) − Etm(d|p) equals to H − L
consequently. Hence, driven by the proposed ZD incentive
mechanism, qt(c|p) can evolve to the maximum.
Theorem 5.2. For any memorial evolutionary miner who is moti-
vated by the ZD incentive mechanism, her cooperation probability
tends to 1 gradually.
Proof: In light of (9), a memorial evolutionary miner
can calculate her cooperation probability according to W tc
and Etm, which can be deduced by (10). In practice, we
use the cooperative frequencies f tp and f
t
m to approximate
pt and qt. Specifically, f tp indicates the number of rounds
the pool cooperates divided by the total number of rounds,
while f tm denotes that of a miner.
Based on the ZD incentive mechanism, we consider the
following two cases, where the miner chooses to cooperate
or defect [17].
a) if the miner is considered as cooperative, the pool may
reward her, resulting in Et+1m ≥ Etm. In this case, with the
increase of Et+1m and f
t+1
m , W
t+1
c turns to
W t+1c =
Et+1m − (1− f t+1m )W t+1d
f t+1m
. (12)
Hence, lim
t→+∞W
t+1
c =
Et+1m −(1−ftm)W t+1d
ftm
> W tc because
of W t+1d = W
t
d .
b) when the miner is regarded as a defective miner, then
we have Et+1m ≤ Etm, and the decrease of Et+1m and f t+1m
will lead to
W t+1d =
Et+1m − f t+1m W t+1c
1− f t+1m
. (13)
Comparably, lim
t→+∞W
t+1
d =
Et+1m −ftmW t+1c
1−ftm < W
t
d be-
cause of W t+1c = W
t
c .
To sum up, Case a) indicates that W tc increases and W
t
d
remains unchanged and Case b) implies that W td declines
while W tc remains steady. Thus, ∃T ∗ ∈ Z+, such that ∀t >
T ∗, W tc > W
t
d holds. Based on this, E
t
m can be derived as
Etm = f
t
mW
t
c + (1− f tm)W td
< f tmW
t
c + (1− f tm)W tc = W tc .
(14)
7In light of (14), we can conclude that qt+1 = qt W
t
c
Etm
→ 1
with the increase of game round t. That is to say, the
memorial evolutionary miner will gradually increase the
cooperation probability to one eventually.
Conclusively, the non-memorial and memorial evolu-
tionary miner will be encouraged to behave cooperatively
by the proposed ZD incentive mechanism in the end.
Another essential nature of the proposed incentive
mechanism is that it can be employed into the prepaid
mechanism as well as the postpaid mechanism, with the
former rewards the miner when a share is submitted and the
latter defines the terminal of a mining round as the time a
block is mined successfully. Noteworthily, the ZD incentive
mechanism is free-fee charged for miners in both prepaid
and postpaid cases due to their wholehearted devotions.
More importantly, in the postpaid mechanism, the proposed
incentive mechanism can hinder pool hopping attackers
without putting any risk on the pools since our mechanism
enables the miners to mine wholeheartedly until a block is
generated successfully.
Now that such a powerful strategy the pool can employ,
he has an overwhelmingly dominant position compared
with the miner, then is the pool capable of getting a higher payoff
greedily through defecting when the miner collaborates? We use
the following theorem as a response to the above concern.
Theorem 5.3. When the miner chooses to cooperate, the only
rational strategy of the pool who employs the ZD incentive
mechanism is to collaborate.
Proof: As demonstrated in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, the
miner will choose to contribute her maximum computa-
tional power into the pool because of the effectiveness of
the proposed ZD incentive mechanism. In this case, the pool
will provide the miner with the maximal payoff. Therefore,
we will discuss what the ZD strategy is when the pool sets
the expected payoff of the miner as the optimal value in the
following.
According to Section 3, the miner’s expected payoff can
be set as Sm =
(1−p1)Sddm +p4Sccm
1−p1+p4 , which belongs to [S
dd
m , S
cc
m ].
Due to
∂Sm
∂p1
=
p4(ρ− σ)
(1− p1 + p4)2 ,
∂Sm
∂p4
=
(1− p1)(ρ− σ)
(1− p1 + p4)2 ,
(15)
∂Sm
∂p1
> 0 and ∂Sm∂p4 > 0 because of ρ > σ as indicated
in Theorem 2.2, implying a monotonically increasing re-
lationship between Sm and p1, p4. Hence, when p1 = 1,
p4 = 1, the pool can maximize the miner’s expected payoff.
Furthermore, according to (4), if p1 and p4 are equivalent to
1, the only possible value of p2 is 1 because p2 should lie in
[0, 1] to be a probability, so as for p3. That is to say, the pool
can set p = (1, 1, 1, 1) to maximize the payoff of a miner.
In light of the above analysis, once the miner cooperates,
the pool will set his ZD strategy as p = (1, 1, 1, 1) to maxi-
mize a collaborative miner’s expected payoff. That is to say,
whenever the miner cooperates, the pool will collaborate
subsequently.
In summary, the pool will be collaborative in return if
the miner offers her maximum computing power. Thus,
the proposed ZD incentive mechanism is fair to both sides,
which makes it be long-term sustainable. Such an aim is
achieved via controlling the miner’s short-term expected
payoff by the pool. Then, what are the players’ actual payoffs
over the long run? This question can be answered by the
following two theorems.
Theorem 5.4. In the long run, the miner’s actual payoff equals
to Km based on our proposed ZD incentive mechanism.
Proof: a) For a non-memorial evolutionary miner,
∃τ ∈ Z+, such that ∀t ≥ τ , qt can be maximaized. That is to
say, when t ≥ τ , the expected payoff of the miner is identical
to Km, which is the maximum payoff for a cooperative
miner. In light of this, the actual payoff of the miner PAm
can be derived as the average of the expected payoff Eim in
each round i, where i < τ and the expected payoff Km after
round τ . Therefore, PAm can be written as:
PAm = limt→∞
Στ−1i=1 E
i
m + Σ
t
i=τKm
t
= Km. (16)
b) The actual payoff of a memorial evolutionary miner is
PAm = limt→∞
W tc − (1− pt)(Km + σ − ρ)
pt
= lim
t→∞W
t
c
= lim
t→∞
Etm − (1− qt)W td
qt
= lim
t→∞E
t
m = Km.
(17)
By inspecting Theorem 5.4, the miner will receive the
actual payoff PAm as Km over the long run. Then, is it possible
for the pool to own more payoff by greedy behavior? This question
can be resolved by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5. In the long run, the pool’s actual payoff PAp is
equivalent to Kp based on our proposed ZD incentive mechanism.
Proof: According to Theorem 5.3, the pool will behave
cooperatively to reward a collaborative miner, implying that
XY = cc is the stable state for the game. In such a case,
PAp = Kp holds according to Table 1.
In light of Theorems 5.4 and 5.5, the pool and miner will
obtain the actual payoffs as Km and Kp, respectively. That
is to say, neither the pool nor the miner can receive higher
reward by noncooperative manner over the long run, which
is quite fair for both sides.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To testify the effectiveness of the ZD incentive mechanism
proposed in Section 4, we conduct experimental simulations
in this section. To be specific, we set the payoff vectors of the
pool and the miner as Sp = (3, 0, 5, 2) and Sm = (3, 5, 0, 2),
which is a typical example of the prisoner’s dilemma. We
also carry out the simulations with other parameter settings
and derive the comparable results. So we omit to present
those results to avoid redundancy. Note that each simulation
is repeated 100 times to get the average value for statistical
confidence.
In detail, if the pool is a ZD adopter competing with
a miner who employs four classical strategies, i.e., ALLC,
ALLD, TFT and WSLS, the miner’s expected payoffs can be
set at a fixed value as shown in Fig. 1. Taking the specific ZD
strategy of the pool p = (0.9, 0.3, 0.8, 0.2) as an example,
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Fig. 1. The expected payoffs of the miner when she adopts ALLC, ALLD,
TFT, WSLS strategies and the pool employs the ZD strategy.
no matter what strategies the miner employs, her expected
payoff will finally become to a constant. That is to say, the
adversary’s outcome can be controlled unilaterally by the
ZD adopter because of his effective strategy.
As mentioned in Section 4, the classical strategies ALLC,
ALLD and TFT are out of our consideration because the
strategies are irrelevant to the payoff of the player. More-
over, WSLS is regarded as a special evolutionary strategy.
Hence, only the simulations of the evolutionary miners who
compete with a ZD pool are included in this work, which
are demonstrated as follows.
In our simulation, we assume there are four miners in
a pool, whose initial computational powers are respectively
m11 = 1,m
1
2 = 2,m
1
3 = 3,m
1
4 = 4
4. Setting the original
cooperation probabilities (CPs) q0 = 0.01, q0 = 0.1, q0 = 0.5
and q0 = 0.8, Figs. 2 and 3 respectively show how the CPs
of the non-memorial evolutionary miners evolve according
to the proposed ZD incentive mechanism when 5= 5 and
8.
Through further observation of Figs. 2 and 3, we can
conclude that the CPs of the non-memorial evolutionary
miners converge to one with different speeds, which is
mainly because of different initial computational invest-
ments and the scaling parameter . To be specific, a miner
with a larger initial computing investment would be more
inclined to accelerate the cooperation process due to the
higher growth of payoff. Intuitively, a higher  brings about
a faster convergence speed of the CP according to (8).
Fig. 4 plots the CPs of a memorial evolutionary miner
driven by the ZD-based incentive mechanism, where the
CPs go up to 1 gradually with the initial values as p0 =
q0 = 0.01, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.8. In detail, each subfigure shows
that the CP of the miner with a small initial input converges
slowly compared with other miners, even though they share
the same initial cooperation probability. The reason may lie
in that the miner with a smaller initial computing invest-
ment may get a relatively lower payoff in the beginning,
leading a slow growth of the expected payoff. Thus, her CP
would rise slower comparably. Moreover, considering the
CPs of a miner with the same initial investment but having
4. The cases in which more miners exist in a ZD pool share the same
conclusion, so we omit it for reducing repetition.
5.  is set to be big enough here so that the maximum cooperation
probability of a non-memorial evolutionary player (calculated by (8)),
can approach to 1.
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Round
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
m1
1
=1
m2
1
=2
m3
1
=3
m4
1
=4
(a) q0 = 0.01
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Round
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
m1
1
=1
m2
1
=2
m3
1
=3
m4
1
=4
(b) q0 = 0.1
0 5 10 15 20
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Round
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
m1
1
=1
m2
1
=2
m3
1
=3
m4
1
=4
(c) q0 = 0.5
0 5 10 15 20
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Round
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
m1
1
=1
m2
1
=2
m3
1
=3
m4
1
=4
(d) q0 = 0.8
Fig. 2. The evolutions of the CPs of the non-memorial evolutionary
miners when  = 5.
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Fig. 3. The evolutions of the CPs of the non-memorial evolutionary
miners when  = 8.
different initial cooperation probabilities, for example, the
blue lines in subfigures (a)-(d), the result is that the higher
the initial CP is, the faster it is converged to one, which is
mainly caused by the memory we mentioned above in light
of (9).
7 RELATED WORK
At present, the researchers mainly focus on three kinds of
security attacks in pooled mining: the selfish mining attack,
the block withholding (BWH) attack and the pool-hopping
attack.
In detail, a selfish mining attacker [18] keeps its mined
block secret and intentionally forks the main blockchain.
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Fig. 4. The evolutions of the CPs of the memorial evolutionary miners.
Specifically, the selfish miner mines on its private branch
instead of working on the public chain as the honest miners.
When the public ledger approaches it’s private chain, the
selfish miner advertises its concealed chain to the public,
leading to wasting resources of the honest miners on re-
solving cryptopuzzles which ends up gaining no rewards.
Several defense mechanisms have been proposed to block
this selfish manner as well as its variants. For example, Saad
et al. [7] developed a defense mechanism in the network-
wide scope to detect and deter selfish miners; Zhang et al.
[8] proposed a backward-compatible mechanism to defend
selfish attacks.
The BWH attackers pretend to devote their computa-
tional capabilities into the target pool and then obtain pay-
offs. However, they send only partial proof of work, not full
proof of work, resulting in reward reduction to other miners
in the pool. This kind of attack was first proposed in [11],
after which, Courtois et al. [19] summarized its concept and
Eyal modeled the confrontation between the pools as a pris-
oner’s dilemma in [5]. Specifically, in [5], a Nash equilibrium
was established, where the rational pools would attack each
other, resulting in a lose-lose situation. Besides, the pools
are trapped into an iterative prisoner’s dilemma, in which
the pool chooses to attack or not is the so called miner’s
dilemma. Ongoing researches on avoiding this attack have
proposed some efficient and cheap defense mechanisms.
For example, Bag et al. in [9] proposed a generic scheme
to counter BWH attacks via employing cryptographic com-
mitment schemes, based on which, an implementation using
hash function was presented as an alternative. Besides, Luu
et al. [12] put forward a power splitting game for the miners
so as to find a solution to fight back the BWH attacks.
Additionally, Hu et al. [10] took advantages of the Zero-
determinant theory to analyze the BHW attacks between
two pools. Based on which, different conditions for the pools
playing the ZD strategy individually and simultaneously
have been demonstrated comprehensively.
We focus on the pool-hopping attack in this work.
Pioneer countermeasures are PPS, PPLNS and their vari-
ants, including the Slush’s method, maximum pay-per-share
(MPPS), and pay-once-PPLNS. Detailedly, the pool manager
can calculate the score of each share based on the exponen-
tial score function s = e
T
c , in which s represents the score
of the share given in time T and c denotes the scaling pa-
rameter. Due to the share’s score, the pool hopping behavior
can be alleviated in mining pools by reducing the score of
shares at the earlier stage of the round while increasing the
score of shares later on. Such kind of score-based method
is recognized as the Slush’s method and has been applied
in the mining pools such as Slushpool [20]. Besides, in the
maximum pay-per-share method, two balances are kept for
each miner, that is, a PPS balance and a proportional balance
[11]. To be specific, if the miner offers a share, her PPS share
balance is increased as if the pool is a PPS pool. When
the pool generates a block, the proportional balances of the
miners are increased as if they have joined a proportional
pool. Based on which, the reward paid for each miner is the
minimum between the PPS balance and the proportional
balance. In pay-once-PPLNS, every share is rewarded at
most once [11]. In other words, the share is deleted after
it is paid, leading a higher probability to the elder shares
to be paid for future blocks. If a share is partially paid, it
will be deleted partially. However, theoretical analysis on
the above mechanisms are lacking and their effectiveness in
preventing pool-hopping attacks still remain an open issue
[21].
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a hopping-proof pooled mining
with fee-free in Blockchain. To that aim, we formulate the
interaction between the pool and any miner as an IPD game
and identify the corresponding conditions. The generality of
our model capacitates the proposed pooled mining to have
wide applicability. Based on the model, we take advantage
of the ZD theory to empower the pool can unilaterally con-
trol the miner’s payoff, which can be used to motivate the
cooperation of the non-memorial and memorial evolution-
ary miners through the proposed ZD incentive mechanism.
Both theoretical and experimental analyses demonstrate the
effectiveness of the ZD incentive mechanism. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to propose a hopping-proof
pooled mining with the natures of fee-free, wide applicability
and fairness at the same time.
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